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Abstract—Spectrum sharing is one of the promising solutions
to meet the spectrum demand in 5G networks that results from
the emerging services like machine to machine and vehicle to
infrastructure communication. The idea is to allow a set of entities
access the spectrum whenever and wherever it is unused by the
licensed users. In the proposed framework, different spectrum
provider (SP) networks with surplus spectrum available may
rank the operators requiring the spectrum, called spectrum
users (SUs) hereafter, differently in terms of their preference
to lease spectrum, based for example on target business market
considerations of the SUs. Similarly, SUs rank SPs depending
on a number of criteria, for example based on coverage and
availability in a service area. Ideally, both SPs and SUs prefer to
provide/get spectrum to/from the operator of their first choice,
but this is not necessarily always possible due to conflicting
preferences. We apply matching theory algorithms with the aim
to resolve the conflicting preferences of the SPs and SUs and
quantify the effect of the proposed matching theory approach on
establishing preferred (spectrum) provider-user network pairs.
We discuss both one-to-one and many-to-one spectrum sharing
scenarios and evaluate the performance using Monte Carlo
simulations. The results show that comprehensive gains in terms
of preferred matching of the provider-user network pairs can be
achieved by applying matching theory for spectrum sharing as
compared to uncoordinated spectrum allocation of the available
spectrum to the SUs.
Index Terms—Spectrum sharing, Matching theory, Dynamic
spectrum access, 5G and beyond networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tremendous increase in data demand and the range of
services provided in 5G wireless networks has resulted in
various approaches to meet the spectrum demand. As the
5G features in terms of envisioned technologies and service
demands dictate, such a trend is not expected to decrease for
the foreseeable future. In order to address the corresponding
wireless capacity demand, it is required to allocate additional
spectrum for 5G communication services. This goal can be
reached mainly via three approaches [1]: (i) Clearing (also
known as refarming) the spectrum and allocating it to 5G ser-
vices; (ii) Sharing spectrum between existing incumbents and
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5G operators; (iii) Using millimeter wave (30GHz-300GHz)
technology.
Refarming is seen as a not-so-straightforward solution, as
most of the useful frequency bands are already occupied by
other radio services and in general cannot be cleared in a short
time frame. Millimetre wave (mm-wave) is concerned with
taking advantage of the vast amount of spectrum available
in the range of 30 to 300 GHz. Bands at these frequencies
have not previously been considered for cellular access, due to
rain attenuation, atmospheric absorption, and huge propagation
losses compared to lower carrier frequencies. In general,
several technological challenges have still to be addressed
before millimeter wave technology can be fully integrated in
5G networks; despite this, mm-wave is seen as a promising
technology with applications in indoor environments and back-
hauling of small cells [2].
In general, spectrum sharing is seen by national regulators,
in both Europe and US, as a viable solution for allocating
additional spectrum in a timely fashion, since technologies
that are capable to implement it already exist [1]. In the
context of spectrum sharing, cognitive radio has been one
of the most popular research approaches [3]. The interested
reader can refer to [4]–[6] for survey papers on cognitive radio
and spectrum sharing, with a view towards future networks.
The author of [7] provides a survey on the usage of cognitive
radio to access TV white spaces. In general, the exploitation of
TV white spaces by uncoordinated unlicensed secondary users,
implies a lack of quality of service (QoS) guarantees to the
secondary users, which has rendered this solution unattractive
to mobile network operators [1].
In [6], the authors provide a brief but comprehensive
description of the main spectrum access techniques, namely
geolocation database, beacon signaling, spectrum sensing and
cooperative sensing, which have been proposed in the literature
for the detection of spectrum holes; the authors then go on to
analyse how each of the above mentioned techniques is in turn
affected by the radio environmental factors. The authors of [8]
investigate the extent to which spectrum sharing in millimeter-
wave networks with multiple cellular operators is a viable
alternative to traditional dedicated spectrum allocation.
On top of sharing in unlicensed bands, Licensed shared
access (LSA) and Citizens Broadband Radio System (CBRS)
have been identified as possible solutions for spectrum crunch.
LSA and CBRS support sharing of spectrum in under-utilized
radar (e.g., marine and less critical aeronautical services) bands
between incumbents and one or more secondary network
operators for relatively longer periods [9]–[11].
In more detail, LSA is a two tier model for spectrum sharing
in licensed bands. The top tier in LSA consists of incumbent
users, who own spectrum and have guaranteed protection
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2from the secondary users. It is possible for the incumbents
to extract revenue from the under-utilised spectrum they own.
The second tier consists of secondary LSA licensees, who
can get short term access rights with a guaranteed quality of
service to the under-utilised spectrum licensed by incumbents.
Protection of the incumbents by sharing in a non-interfering
manner is of critical importance. Given that the incumbent
activity in these bands is often localized in time and/or space,
this leads to the possibility for potential secondary use inside
specified areas, or at specific times. Mobile network operators
(MNOs) can use (on an exclusive basis) the licensed spectrum
owned by other incumbents when and where these incumbents
are not using it. In this way, the incumbents are protected
from harmful interference and the licensees benefit from the
provision of predictable QoS [12], [13]. The band under
consideration for LSA use is 2.3-2.4 GHz in Europe [1], [2].
CBRS differs from LSA in several respects, the number
of tiers being perhaps the most important. In addition to
incumbents and high-priority licensed users, a third tier of
low-priority users is allowed to access the spectrum [14]–
[16]. The third tier in CBRS is known as general authorized
access (GAA). GAA users are allocated spectrum resources
with no interference protection guarantees, and require active
management to ensure that they do not interfere with either tier
one or two users. The band foreseen for CBRS deployment
is the 3.5GHz band in the USA [1], [2]. For the emerging
applications in 5G networks and the spectrum sharing op-
portunities available through LSA and CBRS, novel spectrum
allocation techniques need to be developed, due to the specific
characteristics of said spectrum sharing regimes.
A. Related Work and Our Contribution
Several mathematical tools from the field of economics,
including game theory, auction theory, etc., have been applied
to wireless resource allocation problems [17]. Another such
tool that has gained momentum recently is matching theory,
whose advantages for wireless resource management include
the ability to define general preferences that can handle
heterogeneous and complex QoS-related considerations; and
efficient algorithmic implementations that are inherently self-
organizing [18], [19]. Deferred acceptance (DA), introduced in
[20], is an efficient algorithm that can find such a matching.
Users and resources make their decisions based on their
individual preferences (e.g., QoS metric). The authors of [18]
provide the first comprehensive tutorial on using matching the-
ory to develop innovative resource management mechanisms
in wireless networks, discussing the fundamental concepts
of matching theory and a variety of properties that allow
definition of several classes of matching scenarios. Applica-
tions of matching theory to wireless networks range from
physical layer security systems [21] to small cell networks
[22], from distributed orthogonal frequency-division multiple
access (OFDMA) networks [23] to heterogeneous cellular
networks [24]. [22] proposes a framework which accounts
for interference and performs downlink cell association for
a context-aware network in which preferences capture infor-
mation including application type, hardware size, and physical
layer metrics. In [23] the authors show that classical schemes
such as proportional fair often yield unstable matchings moti-
vating the need to analyze and optimize stable matchings for
self-organizing wireless systems. Matching theory is applied
in [25] to establish energy-efficient stable matching for device
to device pairs and user equipment. For a recent survey of the
progress and challenges in application of matching theory to
wireless networks, the reader is referred to [26].
The application of matching theory to spectrum sharing
has been widely investigated [27]–[29]. In [27] a one-to-one
matching problem is formulated between a set of secondary
users and a set of primary users (channels), depending on
the rate achievable over such channels. In [30] the authors
consider a two-sided one-to-one matching problem, where
secondary users relay primary users’ data in exchange for
spectrum access time; the utility of primary users is the data
rate, while for secondary users the authors account for the rate
and the power used to help the primary. A similar approach
is adopted by [31], where for each pair of matched primary
and secondary users, the primary and secondary users’ utilities
depend on the secondary user’s relay power and primary user’s
spectrum access time reward. [32] proposes a novel distributed
two-stage resource allocation technique for multiple input
multiple output (MIMO) cognitive radio links operating within
an environment of multiple multi-antenna primary links. The
secondary users are matched to primary users’ resources; the
preferences of the secondary users depend on both their own
channels and the leakage channels, while the preferences of
the primary users depend on the interference channels.
All the above mentioned works focus on spectrum shar-
ing in a cognitive radio context, while our work aims at
applying matching theory to spectrum sharing frameworks
with coordinated access to spectrum, focusing in particular
on CBRS. Spectrum resources are provided by a spectrum
provider (SP) network and leased to a spectrum user (SU)
network. Both SPs and SUs have strict preferences (depending
on their individual and possibly heterogeneous requirements)
in the order they want to sell and lease spectrum, respectively
and these preferences may not always match. In this work,
we first develop a general framework for spectrum sharing
between the SPs and the SUs and apply the matching theory al-
gorithms to the spectrum allocation problem. Then, we present
a specific example within the CBRS framework and show
how matching theory helps both SPs and SUs to best match
their priorities in terms of spectrum access on the available
resources. One of the main advantages of using matching
theory for spectrum allocation is the possibility for both SPs
and SUs to express preferences that can embed heterogeneous
and complex considerations not necessarily or exclusively
related to technical requirements. The ability of matching
preferred SP-SU pairs is quantified numerically using Monte
Carlo simulations. The results show the gain provided by the
matching theory algorithms in terms of probability of each SU
getting spectrum from the SP of its first choice.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Fundamentals
of matching theory are introduced in Section II. We discuss
spectrum sharing scenarios in Section III and performance for
these scenarios is quantified numerically in Section IV. Section
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Fig. 1. One-to-one scenario for M = 3 and N = 3.
V concludes with the summary of main results.
II. FUNDAMENTALS OF MATCHING THEORY
First, we formally define the terms SPs and SUs:
Definition 1. Spectrum Provider Network (SP) is a service
provider that provides surplus spectrum to the secondary
market on discrete spectrum allocation instants after meeting
spectrum demands of its own services.
Definition 2. Spectrum User Network (SU) is a service
provider that provides various services, but does not own any
licensed spectrum and requests spectrum from the primary
market when needed.
We consider a network with N SUs and M SPs. Based
on various factors involved (we come back to this point
later), the SUs and SPs have their own priorities for spectrum
allocation from/to SPs and SUs, which may not coincide
always. Favorable pairing of SPs and SUs can help both SPs
and SUs use spectrum more efficiently.
Based on network spectrum sharing constraints, two sharing
scenarios can be defined which are explained below.
A. One-to-One Scenario
In the One-to-One scenario, every SP wants to lease spec-
trum to only one SU. This could be attributed to various
reasons: avoiding complex interference management across
various SUs with different system requirements or just a case
of not allocating spectrum to two SUs competing for business.
This implies if N > M , some of the SUs end up having no
spectrum. We use this scenario for bench marking purposes.
This scenario has been illustrated in Fig. 1.
To maximize SU’s probability of getting spectrum from
the SP of its first preference, we apply stable marriages
matching algorithm [20], which has been applied to solve
similar problems in wireless networks [31]. We first define
some terms used in this work. Denoting set of SPs and SUs
by M = {1, . . . ,M} and N = {1, . . . , N}, we define the
following terms.
Definition 3. Two sided matching market: A two sided
matching market is a market consisting of two disjoint sets
of operators, where an operator on one side can be matched
with only one operator on the other side.
Definition 4. One-to-One Matching: A one-to-one matching
between two disjoint sets M and N can be represented by a
one-to-one correspondence µ(.), where m ∈M is mapped to
n ∈ N if and only if n is also mapped to m [31].
Let us denote one-to-one matching from m to n by µ(m) =
n; and n to m by µ(n) = m.
Definition 5. Preference: The preferences of an SP m is
defined in terms of an ordered list in the decreasing preference,
P (m), on the SU set N such that
P (m) = (n1 . . . , nQ). (1)
where Q ≤ N .
Similarly, preferences P (n) of SUs can be defined as,
P (n) = (m1, . . . ,mL) . (2)
where L ≤M . Note that cardinality of elements in preference
sets P (m) and P (n) can be less than N and M , respectively
as it is not mandatory for every SP and SU to have all the
SUs and SPs in their preference list. For all the scenarios
considered in this work, we assume that both SUs and SPs
have strict preferences and the preferences are known.
We quantify the performance of the proposed algorithms
and scenarios using a quantitative measure called matching
success Sn,i for an SU n given by,
Sn,i =
No. of times spectrum from SP with preference i allocated
Number of times spectrum requested
(3)
Our objective is to maximize Sn,1 and Sn,2 for the SU n given
that the preferences of the SP are fixed1.
We use the DA Algorithm to perform the spectrum matching
between a set of SUs and SPs. Given that an SP m ∈M has
strict preference for every SU n ∈ N and vice versa, each
SU makes an offer to its most preferred SP. Each SP accepts
the offer from the SU with the highest preference level at its
preference list and rejects all other proposals. However, this
acceptance is conditionally held by the SP until it receives an
offer from a more preferred SU. In the next round, all the
SUs rejected by the SPs in the previous round would make an
offer to the SPs next in line in their preference lists. The SP
m ∈ M will accept the offer from an SU nˆ ∈ N only if the
new proposal from SU nˆ is higher at its preference list than
the currently held proposal by SU n, and reject it otherwise. If
the SP accepts the new proposal, it will release the previously
held offer and inform SU n that it has released its proposal.
SU n then proposes to the SP next in its preference list in
the next round. This process continues until all the SUs reach
to the end of their proposal list. At the end of the process,
we have the stable matchings for the scenario discussed. The
pseudocode for the algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. For
convenience, the frequently used notation is summarized in
Table I.
Convergence and Complexity: Convergence for the DA
algorithm is guaranteed. As every proposing SU can at best
propose to an SP once regardless of the decision (accept/reject)
1The goal is to maximize Sn,1. However, if the SU does not get its first
choice SP, it may be happy to receive spectrum from the second choice SP.
4TABLE I
NOTATION SUMMARY
Notation Definition
M Set of Spectrum Providers
N Set of Spectrum Users
P (n) Ordered list of preference for SU n over M
P (m) Ordered list of preference for SP m over N
µ(.) One-to-One correspondence for 2 elements in M and N
Sn,i i
th matching success for an SU n
Algorithm 1: DA Algorithm for Spectrum Matching
Input: (M,N ,P);
P is a matrix, with one row of P (m) for every SP m;
/* T spectrum allocation instants. */
for t=1 to T do
Generate random P (n) for each SU n;
Initialize all m ∈M and n ∈ N to unmatched pairs.
/* Idn is a vector containing id
numbers of the SPs which rejected
SU n’s request */
Idn = φ, ∀n;
while No offer is made by any SU do
Each SU requests to its preferred SP who has not
rejected its offer yet;
Each SP holds onto its most-preferred and
acceptable (if any) offer and rejects all others;
/* Each SU records the SP ids who
rejected its requests. */
Update Idn, ∀n;
end while
Match each SP to the SU whose offer it is holding;
Record the matchings of the SU-SP pairs for instant
t.
end for
Average the matching statistics Si,n,∀n over all t.
Output: Si,n,∀n;
of the SP, the algorithm’s convergence is guaranteed after finite
iterations. As there are N proposing SUs and in each iteration
M SPs are available to be proposed, the computational com-
plexity of the algorithm is O(MN) provided that preference
lists for all n ∈ N and m ∈M are a-priori available.
Stability: The DA algorithm always results into a stable
matching solution, which implies that after matching, there
is no SP m which has a higher preference for an SU n and
the SU n has higher preference for SP m and they are not
matched [31]. The stable matchings in general depend on the
fact that which entity is making the proposal and which one
is accepting/refusing it. In this work, SUs propose first to the
SPs to get spectrum which results in specific stable matchings.
It is clear that SUs start proposing in the order of highest
preference and if accepted are matched to their most preferred
SP. Similarly, SPs hold their most preferred SU until they
find a better proposal. Both of these steps guarantee that the
solution results in stable matching for our spectrum sharing
scenario.
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Fig. 2. Many-to-one scenario for M = 3 and N = 4 where SP A has been
shown to be connected with two different SUs.
B. Many-to-One Scenario
In the many-to-one scenario, some or all of the SPs are
allowed to have more than one slice of spectrum available
which they can allocate to different SUs. Note that every SU
is still allowed to have only one slice allocated. Depending
on resources available, every SU still can get some spectrum
even if N > M . This scenario has been depicted in Fig. 2.
To define the many-to-one matching for the two sided
matching market, we first define the notion of quota qm for an
element m ∈M. qm is the cardinality of the set µ(m) which
contains the elements that can be matched with m ∈M, i.e.,
{µ(m)}1×qm . For this work, qm denotes the maximum number
of spectrum slices available at a single spectrum allocation
instant for SP m. Let us define many-to-one matching in the
following.
Definition 6. Many-to-One Matching: A Many-to-one match-
ing between two disjoint sets M and N can be represented
by a many-to-one correspondence such that,
• µ(n) = {m} if SU n is matched to a spectrum slice from
SP m,
• µ(m) ⊂ N and |µ(m)| ≤ qm,∀m and
• µ(n) = {m} iff n ∈ µ(m),∀n,m.
i.e., m ∈M is mapped to n ∈ N if and only if n is matched
to m; and n is one of the qm elements matched with m.
Thus, many-to-one matching is an extension of one-to-one
matching such that each SU n is connected to only one SP
(as in one-to-one matching), but an SP m can be connected
to multiple SUs with maximum connections bounded by qm.
To solve the problem for many-to-one scenario, we apply
the Gale-Shapley algorithm which was used before for the
college admission problem. This algorithm is a modification
of the DA algorithm presented in Algorithm 1 in such a way
that every SP can hold (and finally accept) up to qm SUs
instead of just one as was the case for one-to-one matching.
The algorithm terminates when either all qm,∀m spectrum
chunks have been allocated or no unallocated SU is left. This
algorithm also guarantees convergence and stability as the DA
algorithm for one-to-one case.
III. SPECTRUM SHARING SCENARIO
We evaluate the proposed approach in the context of the
CBRS. CBRS is based on a three-tiered sharing framework in
which incumbent users - federal and non-federal - represent
the highest tier and are protected from interference generated
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Fig. 3. PALs holders will be allowed to lease any bandwidth for any period
of time and for any portion of their licensed geographic area within the scope
of the PAL but outside of the PAL Protection Area. Green areas represent the
Protection Areas of two PAL holders in the same census tract. The purple
area is the region in which spectrum can be leased to SUs. The orange and
blue areas represent the area of interests of two SUs. For example, SU2 might
prefer to lease spectrum from PA Licensee B because of the larger distance
between their area of operation. For the same reason, for SU1 the two PA
Licensees would be equivalent.
by the two lower tiers - Priority Access (PA) and General Au-
thorized Access (GAA) [9]. A Priority Access License (PAL)
is defined as the authorization to use a 10 MHz channel in a
single census tract for three years. In particular, PA users will
be protected from interference generated by GAA use, while
GAA users will receive no interference protection. PA users
will be protected along the contour of the PAL Protection Area.
Around each deployed Citizens Broadband Service Device
(CBSD) a default protection contour will be determined based
on a signal strength of −96 dBm in 10 MHz. PA Licensees
may opt to reduce their Protection Area. In fact, PA Licensees
may enter into spectrum leasing arrangements with approved
entities for areas that are within their Service Area -the census
tracts where they have a PAL- and outside of their Protection
Areas. Figure 3 shows a census tract and two PA Protection
Areas (in green) corresponding to two PA Licensees. SUs that
are interested in acquiring spectrum resources exclusively in
a certain geographic area may interact with one or more PA
Licensees to negotiate a leasing arrangement. Since different
PA users have potentially different protection areas in the
same census tract, each SU can rank PA Licensees depending
for example on the size of the available area, on the match
between the area of interest (orange and blue areas in Figure
3) and the available area, or on the distance between the
area of interest and the PA protection area. Although leasing
agreements can be negotiated individually, in this paper we
assume that they will be arranged in a common secondary
market in which different PA Licensees and SUs can express
their preferences.
On the other side, PA Licensees could rank SUs based on
different criteria. For example,
1) An MBB operator holding a PAL might prefer to lease
spectrum to a smart grid (SG) or a vehicle to infras-
tructure (V2X) operator rather than to a direct cellular
competitor (target market criterion).
2) Another criterion might be based on the capability of
the SUs to reduce interference. This can be achieved in
several ways including spectrum shaping, interference
cancellation and beamforming techniques, among oth-
ers [33]–[35]. For example, PA Licensees could rank
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF SERVICE AREAS AND HARDWARE CAPABILITIES
SP SU
Identifier Service Area Identifier Service Area Beamforming
Capability
A MBB 1 SG Yes
B SG 2 SG No
C V2X 3 MBB Yes
- - 4 V2X No
SUs depending on whether they can avail of transmit
beamforming capabilities or not. SUs that are able to
perform beamforming would be in general preferred
because they would enable the PA Licensee to enter into
multiple leasing arrangements in the same Service Area,
as a consequence of the inter-SU interference mitigation
enabled by beamforming.
To illustrate the potential of matching theory applied to
CBRS secondary market, we provide an example use case.
We consider a system with 3 PA Licensees, denoted by A,
B and C, which provide services for MBB, SG and V2X
applications, respectively. On the other side, we have 4 SUs,
denoted by SU1, SU2, SU3 and SU4, such that SU1 and SU2
provide SG services, while SU3 and SU4 provide MBB and
V2X services, respectively. SU1 and SU3 have beamforming
capabilities while SU2 and SU4 have no such capabilities.
Target service areas and hardware capabilities of the networks
have been summarized in Table II.
Assuming that the target market criterion takes precedence,
priorities of PA licensees would be,
P (A) = (n1, n2, n4, n3) (4)
P (B) = (n3, n4, n1, n2)
P (C) = (n1, n3, n2, n4)
PA Licensee A has the least priority for SU3, which provides
broadband services and is a competitor to PA Licensee A. The
priority for other SUs is based on the interference mitigation
criterion for PA Licensee A. As SU2 and SU4 have no
beamforming capabilities, they are prioritized just ahead of
SU3 in arbitrary order. SU1 is not a competitor and has
beamforming capabilities and preferred as first choice by PA
Licensee A. The preferences for other PA Licensees follow
the same logic.
As an example, based on protection area and their preferred
service area, the preferences of SUs can, for example, be
defined by,
P (1) = (mA,mB ,mC) (5)
P (2) = (mB ,mA,mC)
P (3) = (mB ,mC ,mA)
P (4) = (mA,mC ,mB)
where SU1 prioritizes PA Licensee A over other PA Licensees
as it provides SU1 a larger service area.
We apply one-to-one matching theory algorithm on this
example. SU1 and SU4 prefer PA Licensee A. PA Licensee A
6TABLE III
PREFERENCES OF SPS FOR N = 3,M = 3
SP Preference List
P (A) (n1, n2, n3)
P (B) (n2, n3, n1)
P (C) (n3, n1, n2)
prefers SU1 over SU4 and therefore, holds on to the proposal
of SU1. SU2 and SU3 both prefer PA Licensee B, but PA
Licensee B prefers SU3 over SU2 and holds onto proposal of
SU3. SU2 proposes PA Licensee A then, but it prefers already
held SU1 over it and rejects the proposal. SU4 proposes to PA
Licensee C who holds on to its proposal. Then, SU2 proposes
to PA Licensee C who accepts the proposal by releasing
SU4 because it has higher priority for SU2 as compared to
SU4. Finally, SU4 proposes PA Licensee B who rejects its
proposal because it already holds more preferred proposal
from SU3. At the termination of the algorithm, all the PA
Licensees are matched with the SUs they hold while SU4
remains unallocated.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To investigate the behavior of the proposed matching theory
approach, we conduct extensive simulations in which the pref-
erences of the SUs are randomly changed to simulate various
combinations of SU preferences resulting into different stable
matchings. Since SU preferences depend on distance from the
PA Licensee protection area, they can change over time. In
fact, while the PA Licensee protection areas stay the same,
the SUs’ areas of interest can vary due to traffic conditions.
For example, SUs could be generally operating as GAA, and
temporarily be interested in acquiring spectrum resources and
protection from interference in certain geographic areas in
case of special events. We assume that the preferences of the
SPs are fixed throughout the simulation period because the
SUs’ beamforming capabilities and the target market remain
unchanged.
A. One-to-One Matching
For the one-to-one scenario, we fix M = 3 and N = 3. At
a spectrum allocation instant, the SUs have a preference list
for their preferred SPs to get a spectrum slice. To focus more
on the effect of SP preference list, the SU preferences are
randomized with uniform probability distribution to simulate
all possible combinations of preferences for the matching
scenarios. For example, SU1 may have a preference list
(mB ,mC ,mA) where the order of preference has been chosen
from a uniform probability distribution. In the next spectrum
allocation instant, another random preference list is generated
from the uniform probability distribution.
For simulations, the preferences of SPs for SUs are (ar-
bitrary but) fixed, and are summarized in Table III. The
preferences of SPs have been chosen in such a way that there
is a symmetry in overall preference statistics such that every
SU appears to be first, second and third preference of exactly
Matching statistics for SU1
70%
17%
13%
Matching statistics for SU2
70%
17%
13%
Matching statistics for SU3
70%
17%
13%
Preference 1 Preference 2 Preference 3
Fig. 4. One-to-one matching statistics for M = 3 and N = 3.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of one-to-one matching with difference SP preferences
and uncoordinated matching.
one SP.2 For example, SU1 is first preference of SP A, third
preference of SP B and second preference of SP C. We perform
Monte Carlo simulations to get matching statistics Si,n,∀i, n.
105 spectrum allocation instants are simulated with a random
preference order generated at each instant for each SU. We
average Si,n,∀i, n over 105 simulations to get our results.
Fig. 4 shows pie charts for Sn,i for the 3 SUs. As the
preferences for the SUs are randomized and the preferences
from the SPs are symmetric, the statistics for all the Sn,i,∀n
are symmetric. All the SUs get spectrum from their first,
second and third choice SP approximately 70%, 17% and 13%
times, respectively.
Fig. 5 compares spectrum allocation statistics for n = 1 for
matching theory and uncoordinated (randomized) matching.
As the Sn,i statistics for all SUs are the same, we plot statistics
2Please note that choice of preference list in Table III is arbitrary for
numerical simulations. In practical systems, the (SP as well as SU) preference
lists are generated from the specific algorithms that represent utility gain of
the respective SP/SU for each candidate SU/SP.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of matching statistics for the DA algorithm for 2 different SP preferences.
TABLE IV
PREFERENCES OF SPS FOR N = 4,M = 3
SP Preference List
P (A) (n1, n2, n3, n4)
P (B) (n2, n3, n4, n1)
P (C) (n3, n4, n1, n2)
for SU1 only. We compare S1,i for SU1 for the DA one-to-one
matching algorithm and uncoordinated matching. S1,1 is 70%
for the DA algorithm, which is only 33% for uncoordinated
matching. To study the effect of SP preferences, we change the
preference of SP B from (n2, n3, n1) to (n1, n3, n2), thereby
giving more preference to SU1. S1,1 improves considerably for
SU1 from 70% to 89%. This explains the underlying business
model that if SU1 wants to get spectrum from the SP of
its choice, it has to invest in improving its capabilities for
interference mitigation.
Fig. 6 shows statistics for One-to-One matching for N = 3
and M = 4 for two different SP preferences. The preferences
of the SUs are random as before. The results in Fig. 6(a)
and Fig. 6(b) have been obtained using 2 different sets of SP
preferences; one summarized in Table IV and the other in (4),
respectively. Due to one-to-one matching, we can see that the
SUs do not get any spectrum for a considerable percentage of
time. As N increases for the SUs, there will be more instants
when spectrum slice will not be allocated to the SUs if only
one-to-one matching is allowed. SU1 has higher unallocated
spectrum instants in Fig. 6(a) as compared to the instances in
Fig. 6(b) because it is first choice of one SP in the former case
and two SPs in the latter. The opposite effect can be observed
for SU2, while SU3 and SU4 behave almost identically due
to smaller changes in their relative preference levels in the SP
priority lists.
Matching statistics for SU1
88%
12%
Matching statistics for SU2
91%
9%
Matching statistics for SU3
96%
4%
Matching statistics for SU4
88%
12%
Preference 1 Preference 2
Fig. 7. Many-to-one matching statistics for M = 3 and N = 4.
B. Many-to-One Matching
We evaluate performance of the many-to-one matching
algorithm and show how it improves the matching statistics as
compared to one-to-one matching, and minimizes probability
of unallocated spectrum for SU when M < N . Fig. 7 shows
matching statistics for M = 3 and N = 4 case when every SP
m can provide one spectrum slice each to at most 2 different
SUs at every spectrum allocation instant, i.e., quota qm equals
2 for each SP m. We use SP preference list from Table IV.
It is apparent this results in great improvement in spectrum
allocation for all the SUs as compared to one-to-one matching
and unallocated spectrum slots vanish completely while the
SUs have more opportunities to get spectrum slice of their
first and second choice at the same time.
Fig. 8 shows matching statistics for the Many-to-One match-
ing for M = 3 and N = 4 case, when only SP A have 2
slices available for 2 different SUs, while other SPs have only
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Fig. 8. Many-to-one matching statistics with only SP A has two slices
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P(C)=(n3,n4,n1,n2) P(C)=(n3,n4,n2,n1) P(C)=(n3,n2,n4,n1)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Fi
rs
t C
ho
ice
 S
lic
e 
Al
lo
ca
tio
n 
in
 %
SU2
SU3
Fig. 9. Many-to-one matching statistics with only SP A has two slices
available and preference for SP C varies.
one slice available. SU2 is the real beneficiary of this ’bias’
in spectrum availability from different SPs. SP A has two
spectrum slices available, which implies that the SUs who are
first and second preference of SP A, will always get spectrum
of their first choice if they request spectrum from SP A as
their first choice. The SUs who are second preference of SP
B and C do not get spectrum slice from SP B and C with
probability one even if they prefer SP B and C.
Due to lack of spectrum availability in the market (not every
SP can accommodate 2 SUs), the probability of SUs getting
spectrum from the SP of their first and second choice decreases
as compared to the case discussed in Fig. 7. This ’bias’ in
spectrum availability from different SPs shows that the SUs
have to adapt their spectrum leasing strategy by investing in
a way that improves their chances to lease spectrum from the
SP which allows multiple SUs. We observe that SU3 gets slice
of its first choice for more time as compared to SU2. To study
this behaviour further, we plot the results in Fig. 9.
Fig. 9 shows matching statistics for Many-to-One matching
for M = 3 and N = 4 case, when only SP A has 2 slices
available. However, we change preferences of SP C and study
the effect on the matching statistics of SU2 and SU3. All
other SPs have the same preferences as shown in Table IV.
The reason for SU3 having higher probability to get its first
choice (and not SU2) lies in overall distribution of preferences
of SU3 for all SPs. SU3 is first preference of SP C, second
preference of SP B and third preference of SP A. However,
SP A has two spectrum slices available. If one of SU1 and
SU2 does not demand a slice from SP A and SU3 does, it gets
it. This implies that that SU3 is effectively second preference
of SP A. On the contrary, SU2 is second preference of SP A,
first preference of SP B; but 4th preference of SP C. If SU2
demands a spectrum slice from SP C as its first preference, it
has very small chance of getting it because it requires SUs 1,
3 and 4 not asking for it. This has a huge impact on overall
statistics for SU2 to get spectrum of its first preference. To
quantify this effect, we repeat the experiment by changing
preferences of SP C with respect to SU2. We do not change
preferences for SU3. We observe, when SU2 moves ahead in
the preference list of SP C, its statistics start improving in
terms of getting spectrum slice of its first preference. When
SU2 moves to be the second preference of SP C, its S2,1
is higher than S3,1 in spite of being first preference of only
SP B. This shows that it is not necessary for an SU to be
first choice of more SPs to increase its chances of getting
spectrum of first chance. It should be noted that moving ahead
in SP priority list requires to equip with beamforming (costly
hardware) capabilities and requires investment from the SU.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We apply matching theory to a spectrum sharing scenario
between the SP and SU networks to benefit both parties. The
SPs and SUs have a preference order that depends on their
individual benefits from spectrum sharing with each other. We
discuss a general framework first and apply it to CBRS as
an example of commercial spectrum sharing. We numerically
evaluate the performance of matching theory algorithms for
one-to-one and many-to-one spectrum sharing scenarios and
quantify the effect of preferences of both SPs and SUs. The
ability of an SU to get spectrum from the SP is measured
by a metric Sn,i, which is the probability of an SU n to get
spectrum from the SP of its ith preference in its preference
list. The results show that application of matching theory
DA algorithms improves Sn,1 for the SUs as compared to
uncoordinated matching of SP-SU pairs. One of the main
advantages of using matching theory for spectrum allocation
is the possibility for both SPs and SUs to express prefer-
ences that can embed complex considerations not necessarily
or exclusively related to technical requirements for network
operation. This framework can be very helpful in spectrum
sharing scenarios in future networks, where it is critical to
match the priorities of various SP and SU networks to make
the best use of the spectrum resources.
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